Abstract
Introduction
Terrorist attacks and active shooter events account for a growing number of mass casualty and major incidents in the UK, Europe and the USA. In order to better prepare for future incidents, analysis of prior events is essential.
Methods
Systematic literature searches of papers published between 1/1/2004 and 5/31/2018 were conducted using two key databases: CINAHL Plus and PubMed (indexed from MEDLINE). Key contents of identified papers were abstracted, including EMS response and patient management, with emphasis placed upon identified recommendations and lessons learned.
Results
Four hundred and forty-two records were identified in the preliminary search, with 176 records further screened using the title and abstract. Ten papers were included in the final review, reflecting 13 events from five countries across two continents. Three major themes identified throughout the papers were emergency preparedness, resilience and response (EPRR), casualty triage, and tactical emergency medical services (TEMS). These themes were present in 90%, 70% and 40% of the papers respectively.
In addition to terrorist attacks, active shooter incidents can produce similar deadly results. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation defines an active shooter incident as "an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area" (FBI, 2018) . According to the most recent statistics, 27 active shooter events occurred in 2018, resulting in 85 fatalities and 128 wounded individuals (U.S. Department of Justice, 2018).
Prior studies have highlighted the need to review major incidents, identify common themes, and make recommendations for policy adoption and response agency practice (Moran et al, 2017; Thompson et al, 2014) . The purpose of the current study was to perform a systematic review of recent mass violence events and establish some fundamental areas for improvement.
Methods
This was a structured database review using the online databases CINAHL Plus and PubMed. The inclusion dates 1/1/2004 -5/31/2018 were selected to capture extensive literature on terrorist attacks and active shooter events. The decision to limit studies to the United Kingdom, Europe, and the USA was taken due to similarities in societal structure and government response. Searches were conducted on 31 st May 2018 into both databases using the inclusion criteria listed in Table 1 . Exclusion factors and the screening process have been listed in figure 1 and a summary of the literature is reported in Table 2 . 
Literature Summary

Results
Four hundred and forty-two records were identified in the preliminary search, with 176 records further screened using the title and abstract. Ten papers were included in the final review, reflecting 13 events from five countries across two continents ( Figure  1 ).
Figure 1. PRISMA Diagram.
After data abstraction, three major themes were identified (Table 3 ). These were:
1. Further confounding initial on scene confusion and concerns regarding scene safety were frequently noted, leading to compromised decision-making in triage and patient care. Scene safety was a key factor in the overall response to the injured in the classrooms and buildings of Virginia Tech, based upon uncertainty over shooter location. Similarly, Wild et al (2012) describes the chaos of on-scene operations at the Fort Hood shooting. Unconfirmed reports and confusing statements led responders to believe the presence of multiple active shooters, leaving commanders to make difficult decisions about triage and transportation.
In contrast, sometimes the threat is underestimated. During the London Bridge attack, some initial calls suggested a simple traffic accident, resulting in responders being unaware of the actual threat, compromising scene safety. Similar findings have been noted in analyses in the United States, in which more than 15% of calls failed to relay a safety risk concern to responding EMS personnel (Klassen et al, 2018) . Command structures must anticipate this "fog of war" and make decisions to mitigate the confusion. On-scene command and control may assist with this.
Direct threats from gunmen are not the sole concern for responding crews. During the San Bernardino MTFA, lack of IED awareness resulted in the tactical command post and casualty collection point being located within the blast radius. Furthermore, the IEDs were only discovered during extrication of patients from the building by conventional EMS. This incident serves to highlight the adoption of militarised tactics even by active shooters (Bobko et al, 2018) . Additional threats noted include risk of structural collapse, toxic atmospheres, contamination, and situational risks such as live rails (Lockey et al, 2005; Hunt, 2018) .
Logistical concerns frequently impact the response to mass violence events. One frequently identified area for improvement is the means by which non-ambulatory casualties can be rapidly extracted. During both the 2015 multi-site MTFA in Paris and the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, responding emergency services were faced with a lack of available stretchers (Hunt, 2018; Service Médical du Raid, 2016; kerslakearenareview, 2018 (Hunt, 2018; kerslakearenareview, 2018) . Multiple US authors praised training exercises as an invaluable resource. EPRR elements should be a key aspect of such training.
Given the complexities of responding to mass violence events, multi-agency collaboration is a critical factor for successful response. Both Hunt (2018) and Carli et al (2017) note the utility of military assistance to civilian authorities, both from an educational and operational perspective. Knowledge translation of military injury patterns and appropriate treatments, including tourniquets and other elements of damage control resuscitation, to the civilian sector is critical for future response at both the prehospital and hospital levels (King, 2019; Cannon, 2018 HART was developed in the wake of 7/7, realising the demand for a special unit to respond to these types of threatening environments. With the ability to operate within the warm zone of an MTFA, HART was utilised to extricate patients to the cold zone where ordinary paramedics had erected a casualty clearing station and command point (NARU, 2018). These actions made by the commanders and paramedics on the night were correct in adhering to the well-established policies. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Program (JESIP) was developed in 2013 and offers command and control principals in which police, fire and rescue and ambulance services now practise (JESIP, 2017) . These command principals may have contributed to the success of the management by the ambulance service at Manchester arena. On the contrary, few ambulance personnel volunteered to enter the hot zone and commence the triage of patients. This is against conventional practice in the UK, however, the police authorised the access due to the perception of there being minimal threat. These actions by the personnel were directly credited by Lord Kerslake, chairman and author of the Kerslake Report evaluating this terrorist attack. Kerslake continues to show admiration for the ambulance service, as patients were treated and transported incredibly effectively, with only 1 patient requiring a secondary transfer (kerslakearenareview, 2018) . These points echo the fluidity of operations in regard to scene safety, zoning, command structure and decision-making.
Triage
Triage refers to the rapid sorting of casualties, with the intent of doing "the most for the most." Triage has been noted to be an issue at almost every mass casualty incident, often due to lack of systems-knowledge or lack of ability to perform due to concern for on-going threats. Although numerous triage systems exist, the best triage system remains unclear and is continually debated (Vasallo, Smith and Wallis, 2018; Silvestri et al, 2017) .
At the Madrid train bombings, EMS crews were unable to use the existing triage system due to both a lack of knowledge and a lack of triage tags (Carresi, 2008) . Similar issues with triage were noted in the Norway attacks. At the time, Norwegian EMS had no national triage system, and so responders defaulted to the primary survey consisting of catastrophic haemorrhage, airway, breathing, circulation, disability and exposure in order to identify critical patients (Sollid et al, 2012) . Although a formal triage system was lacking in this response, the ad hoc approach was still successful as no patients died on their way to hospital. A standardised triage system might minimise errors in casualty prioritisation. As highlighted by the Manchester Arena attack, responders should prepare to triage and treat large numbers of pediatric casualties which poses as a unique challenge.
In contrast to lack of knowledge, scene safety concerns limited use of triage systems at several events, with resultant over-and under-triage. During the response to the Virginia Tech shooting, EMS were denied access to the scene during the period of on-going threat. Two tactical medics attached to responding law enforcement teams were deployed to the hot zone (Kaplowitz et al, 2007) . The medics were able to begin triaging the wounded, perform life-saving interventions, and prepare the casualties for extraction, prior to the arrival of conventional EMS. These key actions contributed to the success of the prehospital response. The presence of TEMS provides comfortable operations in the hot zone and when integrated into tactical teams permitted both rapid triage and treatment, without placing unnecessary delays on first patient contact. None of the UK incidents mention provision of medical care by police officers or any other medical care available to victims inside the hot zone. This suggests the presence of a potential delay in providing patient care, in an environment too hostile for conventional EMS teams to operate. This grey-area hints that the UK may benefit from the addition of a TEMS framework similar to that of the USA and France, and to that currently found amongst UK special operations forces.
Conclusion
Based upon the available data, prehospital organisational response to mass violence events continues to evolve and improve. In response to incidents in neighbouring jurisdictions, specific exercises have been undertaken to test local responses to similar events. Practice gaps and necessary changes have been identified as part of the after-action review process. However, society needs to be vigilant and approach such changes with a degree of caution, as to prepare for the next event rather than the last. Despite great strides in preparedness and response, there remain opportunities for improvement, some of which have been previously identified. The lack of casualty extraction devices noted in Paris and Manchester had previously been highlighted in Norway, and a solution identified. Even when gaps have been identified, they have not always been closed. Some identified problems may require significant redesign of current response systems. For example, the impact of scene safety concerns upon patient triage has been in part mitigated by the use of trained TEMS providers in the hot zone in both the US and France. This capability does not currently exist in the UK. The international community continues to acknowledge the severity of terrorism and the challenges it poses to EMS providers, but gaps still remain. Formal study of these events is difficult due to the unpredictable and chaotic nature of actual events and artificialities inherent in drills. Continued dissemination of lessons learned is critical in developing a robust response infrastructure, designed to both protect responders and save the lives of terror casualties.
